The institutional capacity of constitutional review measures the ability of the constitutional court concerned to resist political and social intervention in its decision making. According to the nature and strength of its institutional capacity, constitutional review is divided into three ideal forms: normative, selective, and nominal. The institutional capacity of constitutional review mainly depends on four key variables: the degree of political competition, the convergence of interests between the major political actors and constitutional review, the constitutional judges’ perception of their own roles, and the legal tradition of the nation concerned. The Hungarian constitutional review has experienced almost a full cycle from the nominal review during the pre-transition socialist state, the strong normative review followed by an ordinary normative review during the post-socialist state, and selective review after one party dominated the Hungarian politics. The transformation can be explained from the political and social perspective. The Hungarian Constitutional Court was made strong by the pluralistic pattern of party competition, as much as by the outstanding leadership of László Sólyom. The constitutional review became normal when the Hungarian political environment became one of consolidated democracy composed of two major parties, partly thanks to the constraints of European integration. In 2010, when the ruling coalition led by Orban formed an overwhelming majority in the government, overwhelming enough to subvert the constitutional order, the Hungarian constitutional court was fatally weakened and gradually relegated itself to selective review. Key Words: Constitutional review; institutional capacity; political logic; party politics; legal culture

憲法審查制度能力是憲法審查抵禦政治壓力以及干預政治和社會能力的綜合反應。按照憲法審查制度能力的性質和強度，可以將憲法審查劃分為規範性審查、選擇性審查以及名義性審查三種理想形態。憲法審查制度能力主要取決於四個關鍵變數，分別為政治競爭度、利益趨同性、國家法治傳統和法官角色認知。 按照憲法審查的理想形態，迄今為止，轉型前後的匈牙利先後經歷了名義性審查、強規範性審查、規範性審查以及選擇性審查的形態。匈牙利第一憲法法院的強審查形態，是由政黨競爭的格局、轉型階段首要政治利益以及院長的卓越領導能力決定的；而後索庸時代的憲法法院受制於鞏固型政治特點，以及兩大黨持續競爭的結構模式和歐洲一體化的制約；進入了 2010 年，隨著奧班主政匈牙利，開啟了顛覆憲政秩序的大門，憲法法院遭到削弱，憲法審查逐步淪為選擇性審查。 關鍵詞：憲法審查 制度能力 政治邏輯 政黨政治 法治文化