In accordance with the Section 69 of British Arbitration Act 1996, when certain conditions are met, the arbitral party or parties may appeal to the High Court on questions of law arising out of an award made in the proceedings, where the court may by order confirm the award, vary the award, remit the award to the tribunal for reconsideration in the light of the court’s determination, or set aside the award in whole or in part, and if permitted by the Court, its decision on the appeal may be appealed to the Court of Appeal. And in accordance with the Section 71, where the award is varied, the variation has effect as part of the tribunal’s award and where the award is remitted for reconsideration, the tribunal shall make a fresh award within a determined time. The term named “the Mechanism of Appealable Arbitral Awards” will be used to describe the above judicial review system where the arbitral party or parties choose to object to the court on questions of law in the arbitral awards, by which the appealable arbitral awards include awards of the arbitral tribunal before the appeal, awards with the variation of court or with the reconsideration of the arbitral tribunal after the appeal. For the awards made by the court or by the arbitral tribunal after the proceedings of variation or remission, a question may be given rise to whether the awards are “arbitral awards” or “judgment of court” and whether they are admissible to the New York Convention. For the original awards revoked, varied or remitted for reconsideration, a question may also be given rise to whether these awards may not be recognized and enforced pursuant to the Article V of the New York Convention. In the judicial practice, some national courts where their recognition and enforcement are sought may accept this kind of judicial order from the British High Court and enforce the awards varied by the Court, like what the Xia Men Maritime Court of China did in the case “Covington Marine Corp v. Xiamen Shipbuilding Industry”. Meanwhile, some national courts may refuse to accept these judicial orders but to enforce the original awards appealed pursuant to the New York Convention, like what the French Supreme Court did in the case “PT Putrabali Adyamulia v Rena Holding”. As to the said enforceability problem of the New York Convention of the appealable arbitral awards, the obvious particularity of the British Mechanism of Appealable Arbitral Awards can be figured out as the initial cause resulting in the differences among national courts. What is the most important reason is that there is nothing about the awards varied or remitted in the New York Convention. Besides, different national court may apply different test criterions to these awards, which is no doubt the direct reason, that is, some national courts think that the law of country where the awards were made should be based on as the criterion to judge whether these awards are applicable to the New York Convention, whereas some others disagree with it. And last but not least, the Article V and VII of the New York Convention stipulate respectively that the national courts where recognition and enforcement of awards are sought should have its own right of discretion and should apply the more favorable terms to recognize and enforce the foreign awards, by which some national courts choose to enforce the original awards appealed, which undoubtedly makes further complicated the enforceability issue of the appealable arbitral awards. Regardless of whatever solutions may be suggested in order to resolve the above problems, the author thinks that it should be insisted the spirit of New York Convention in favor of recognition and enforcement of awards, which is also the key point for the success of the Convention. Secondly, a more pragmatic view should be taken to think about the relevant issues and understand sufficiently and comprehensively the different considerations of the national courts where the awards were made and where are sought to enforce the awards, balancing these different considerations as much as possible instead of just arguing which ones are right or wrong. The author has put forward the so-called “double criterions in favor of the enforcement of awards” to try to balance the conflicts of considerations. Finally, the author suggests that the Article V of the Convention should be modified to avoid the phenomenon in which the national courts where enforcement of awards are sought choose to recognize and enforce the original awards of arbitral tribunals directly depending on this Article.

依据《英国 1996 年仲裁法》第 69 条的规定，在符合一定的条件下，仲裁当 事人可就仲裁裁决中存在的法律问题向高等法院上诉，法院可以对裁决予以确认、 修改、撤销或发回仲裁庭并按法院决定重新审理裁决，同时在该法院允许的情况 下，可就该法院对上诉的决定进一步上诉到上诉法院。同时，依据《英国 1996 年仲裁法》第 71 条的规定，裁决一经修改，该修改部分即有效并构成仲裁庭裁 决的一部分；如裁决被发回仲裁庭重审，仲裁庭应在一定期限内重新作出裁决。 本文将之称为“可上诉仲裁裁决机制”，用以描述《英国 1996 年仲裁法》下 仲裁当事人就仲裁裁决中的法律问题向法院提出异议的司法审查制度。依据该可 上诉仲裁裁决机制，可上诉的仲裁裁决指的是可受上诉判决影响的仲裁裁决，包 括上诉前的仲裁庭的裁决、上诉后法院修改后的裁决以及发回重审后重新作出的 裁决。 对于修改后或发回重审后的裁决，会面临属于“仲裁裁决”还是“法院判决” 因而能否适用《纽约公约》的争论。被撤销、修改或发回重审的原仲裁裁决，也 即上诉前的原裁决，会面临是否属于《纽约公约》第五条所规定的“被撤销或停 止执行”的裁决而可以拒绝承认执行的争论。在司法实践中，存在执行地法院接 受仲裁地法院的司法裁定意见而对修改后的裁决予以承认执行，如“厦船重工案” 中的中国厦门海事法院。同时，也存在执行地法院对仲裁地法院的司法裁定意见 不予接受而对原仲裁裁决适用《纽约公约》予以承认执行,如“PT Putrabali Adyamulia v Rena Holding”案中的法国最高法院。 对于上述可上诉的仲裁裁决的《纽约公约》可执行性问题，英国可上诉仲裁 裁决机制具有很大的特殊性，这是不同国家法院对之产生分歧的起始原因；《纽 约公约》对修改后的或发回重审后的裁决尚未规定，是最重要的原因；不同国家 法院对此类裁决适用不同的判断依据则是直接的原因，即有的国家认为应当依据 仲裁地法来判断此类裁决是否是仲裁裁决，有的国家则对此不认同；《纽约公约》 第 5 条与第 7 条分别规定执行地国法院对外国裁决享有自由裁量权以及应当适用 更有利于裁决执行的规定来对外国裁决予以承认执行，因此部分国家法院会对上 诉前原裁决予以承认执行，这无疑使得可上诉的仲裁裁决的《纽约公约》可执行 性问题进一步复杂。 对于上述问题的解决，笔者认为无论建议何种解决方法，首先应当坚持《纽 约公约》支持裁决承认与执行的精神，因为这是《纽约公约》在现代国际仲裁领 澳门大学法学硕士学位论文 III 域取得巨大成功的关键因素。其次，应当以比较务实的眼光去考虑相关问题的解 决方法，充分并且全面地理解仲裁地国与执行地国对此类问题的不同考虑，尽可 能地对两方考虑进行平衡，避免简单地论证孰对孰错。笔者对此提出了“有利于 裁决执行的双重判断标准”。最后，对《纽约公约》第 5 条提出修改建议，避免 执行地法院直接依据该条对仲裁地法院撤销或停止执行的裁决予以承认执行。