MBO is a kind of purchase way, which means the management personnel of the target company use loan capital to purchase all or most of the shares of the target company in order to control it and attain the expected profits. It can effectively coordinate the relations between the rights of surplus demand and surplus command. And it has already acquired notable effects on reducing agent costs, improving management structures, promoting business achievements and so on, MBO reflects western countries’ deep reforms and tremendous changes on the corporate management structures in the past twenty years. Recently, it is becoming a popular topic of law of the reform of state-owned enterprises and stock markets in China. Practically speaking, it has already got good effects on defining the property right of state-owned enterprises, and optimizing company’s management structures. However, during the process of MBO in China, the problems, such as the main body of purchasing, setting a price, financing, inner control( protecting the small and medium stockholders’ benefits) and so on, which couldn't be supervised by perfect law systems, resulted in lots of MBO's trouble, which was covert and unfair, This not only encroached on most of the small and medium stockholders’ benefits, but also made lots of state—owned assets lost. After putting forward the issues, this thesis focuses on the concept and characteristics of MBO, the differences between China and western countries’ MBO, the history of western MBO. In addition, it employs the methods of substantial evidence and comparison analysis, from the viewpoint of legal theory and law practice, to systematically analyze the listed companies’ main purchase part, list price, financing and inner control. Meanwhile, the thesis utilizes trust law to put forward concrete law plan to solve the issues above. In conclusion, the law issues that current Chinese MBO are confronting can be solved by two principles, stopping losing the state—owned property and protecting the small and medium stockholders’ benefits, and strengthen the improvement of law system.

上市公司管理层收购(MBO)即是指上市公司的管理层利用自有资金或外部融资来购买其所经营的上市公司的股份，以此完成由单纯的公司管理者到股东法律地位的转变并进而改变上市公司股权结构、控制权结构的商事行为。MBO行为的法理基础考量是一种民商事法律行为。结合中国大陆的具体实践，中国化的 MBO 被归纳为是一种具有政府干预色彩的特殊的民商事法律行为。在对公司治理的影响方面，其所代表的经营者控制模式，即使经营者拥有剩余索取权和剩余控制权可能是公司治理中最有效率的一种方式。但应当明确的是，MBO自始至终是管理层进行自我激励的一种手段。在目前中国证券市场的法律制度尚不健全的情况下，有必要在鼓励和支持上市公司管理层推行MBO前,针对实施MBO的诸多环节完善相应的法律环境，既要从制度上为推行上市公司MBO排除障碍，又要防止MBO的运作因缺乏有效的制度约束而被上市公司管理层恶意地滥用，从法律的角度分析，上市公司 MB0的运作分为三个时间段:第一阶段,上市公司管理层进行 MB0 收购的前期准备工作，即首先设立MB0收购主体和进行融资的相关法律问题:第二阶段，上市公司管理层在 MBO 过程中，即管理层以控股为目的对上市公司的股权进行收购的相关法律问题，包括 MBO中的关联交易、公司财务和股权定价、信息披露等法律问题；第三阶段，上市公司 MBO 完成后即管理层控股上市公司并对其行使控制权，以及对公司监管的法律问题。本文将依此时间顺序展开对上市公司 MBO相关法律问题的研究。 主题词：上市公司 MBO 法律障碍 制度完善