In view of the problems of additional inventory costs and inaccurate demand estimation caused by information asymmetry in the traditional supply chain, it has severely damaged the profits of all participants and restricted the overall development of the supply chain. From the perspective of game theory and information economics, there is a “principal-agent" relationship with asymmetric information among enterprises at each node of the supply chain. Information sharing may help the supply chain increase overall revenues, but it changes the original revenue allocation pattern. As a result, companies with information advantages see their enthusiasm reduced for collaboration due to insufficient incentives, and ultimately result in unwillingness to share information or even information islands. Therefore, new technologies and ideas are urgently needed to solve these problems. The blockchain technology with its advantages such as decentralization, transparency, traceability, confidentiality and immutability, etc., is widely accepted as a disruptive technology as a powerful tool to resolve information asymmetry. The introduction of blockchain into the information system for facilitating information sharing among enterprises at various nodes will effectively promote supply chain collaboration. The thesis takes the supply chain as the research object. First, it establishes the Stackelberg game model to analyze the optimal benefits in the centralized information sharing mode and the information non-sharing decentralized mode, and finds that benefits generated under the centralized information sharing mode far surpass that of the decentralized mode, before using MATLAB to numerically verify the proposed model and conclusions. Second, it uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the strategy changes and influencing factors in the information sharing choices of supply chain participants through dynamic equations and numerical experiments, and verifies the research results through MATLAB simulation. Finally, based on the improved Shapley value, an algorithm model of supply chain revenue distribution with information sharing incentives is proposed, and numerical examples are used to verify the model, which proves that the revenue distribution algorithm can promote supply chain sharing collaboration and Pareto improvement to a certain extent.